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Abstract
Due to the complex voting and decision-making mechanisms of the EU, the size-factor has long 
been present within EU studies as a relevant and significant variable in explaining member states’ 
activism. Despite the aim of small states to achieve equal representation, there is a huge discrepancy 
between the power of big and small states within the EU. Therefore, the expected behavior of small 
states is different from that of the big ones. However, there are also significant differences in 
foreign policy activism within the group of small EU states and those are analysed in this article. 
In order to differentiate small states’ activism within EU foreign policy, the article explores the 
correlation between the scope and number of small states’ leadership initiatives in EU foreign policy 
and different quantitative criteria used to define these small states (population, total GDP, GDP per 
capita).
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Introduction
Existing studies on small states suggest that one rule is a permanent 
feature: there are as many different criteria and thus classifications of 
small states as there are authors.1 Most EU studies use population, territory 
and GDP as the main criteria when defining a state. Panke (2010: 799), 
for example, analyzed the allocation of votes in the Council of the EU 
(Council of Ministers), where states with fewer votes than the EU-average 
were defined as small. This approach is more reliable as it comprises the 
size and population of the member states at the same time. However, 
there are more subjective definitions of small states, singling them out 
as the weaker parties in an asymmetric relationship, unable to change 
its nature on their own. As a consequence, all EU member states are 
considered small, except for France, Germany and the UK, which makes 
this approach too selective and oversimplified  (Mouritzen, Wivel 2005: 4; 
Howard Grøn, Wivel 2011: 524).  
Due to the complex voting and decision-making mechanisms of the EU, 
the size-factor has long been present within EU studies as a relevant and 
significant variable in explaining member states’ activism. Despite the fact 
that the aim of the different institutional mechanisms, such as the voting 
system in the Council of the EU (Council of Ministers), or the distribution of 
seats in the European Parliament, is to achieve equal representation, many 
claim that there is a huge discrepancy between the power of big and small 
states (Czina 2014: 7). Namely, big states have more voting power in the 
Council of the EU under the majority voting provision, which now applies to 
most areas of policy making. They can also more credibly exercise a veto in 
cases where unanimity is required and make side-deals outside the formal 
decision-making process (see Keating, McEwen and Harvey 2014).
Although there are various criticisms of studies of small states, which 
notably focus on objective (quantitative) characteristics of states, instead 
of looking at more subjective circumstances (such as political capacities 
and constraints), this article uses a quantitative approach for explaining 
small states’ leading initiatives in the realm of EU foreign policy (Czina 
1 For more information on classification of small states see: Luša, Kurečić 2014: 266-280.
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2014:8). When quantitative criteria are used in defining small states, it is 
most likely that at least one of these three main characteristics of any 
particular state are considered: population, area and GDP.
Thorhallsson and Wivel argue that both objective factors (the material, 
quantifiable aspects of power) and subjective factors (the perception 
of power) have to be examined to determine the influence of a state 
(Thorhallsson, Wivel 2006: 654), which is measured by comparing member 
states’ preferences to what they have achieved in a certain policy area 
(Czina, 2014:6-7). However, we decided to analyze the correlation between 
the scope and intensity of small states’leadership initiatives2 (or activism)3 
in the EU foreign policy and different quantitative criteria (population, total 
GDP, GDP per capita), with the aim of explaining the differences among 
small EU member states. This article argues that quantitative criteria are 
still a relevant and significant variable in explaining the behavior of small 
states in the EU. Small states are likely to possess characteristics which are 
different from those of big states; therefore it can be expected that their 
behavior will be different as well (Thorhallsson 2011: 1). However, there are 
huge discrepancies even within the group of small states, which are also 
analyzed in this article. Namely, older small member states are generally 
believed to be more active and effective in the EU than the new ones, 
because of their experience, influence, networks and expertize. Therefore, 
the starting question is: what factors determine the activism of small states 
within the EU policy framework (Czina 2014: 3)? We claim that in terms of 
EU foreign policy initiatives population, total GDP and GDP per capita are 
very important defining features.
Data about the total population (2013),4 GDP and GDP per capita (2013)5 
2 A foreign policy initiative is described as an activity of states attempting to further their interests and increase their 
influence on the international stage. This term does not incorporate the result of power or the effectiveness of such 
action, but instead focuses on the attempt made by the state. This attempt is characterized by a large amount of 
substantial and autonomous activity initiated by the state or in conjunction with other states in events occurring 
abroad (Scheldrup 2014: 16).
3 Foreign policy activism can be defined as a policy or strategy aimed at creating, preserving or changing a given 
international order according to the interests and values of the policy-maker. Holm (2002) has suggested that the 
concept of activism has three dimensions: (1) the degree of initiative, (2) the strategically based use of available 
means in a continual pursuit of goals and (3) the resources set aside and mobilized in a prioritized fashion. An active 
policy also involves taking risks.
4 The population of the EU and its member states (estimate on January 1, 2014): http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/
table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00001&plugin=1 (accessed 28 May 2014)
5 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/
 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/GDP_per_capita,_consumption_per_capita_and_
price_level_indices#Further_Eurostat_information (accessed 29 September 2014)
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were discussed in order to determine which states would be included 
in the analysis. According to ECFR Scorecard reports for 2011, 2012 and 
2013, the number of foreign policy initiatives in which some state had 
a leading role, were taken into account with the aim of analyzing the 
relation between the size of the EU member states and the level of their 
activism within the EU foreign policy arena. The Scorecard provides 
annual assessments of the EU institutions’ performance on 80 policy areas 
around six key themes: China, Russia, the United States, Wider Europe 
and Crisis Management and Multilateral issues. However, the Scorecard’s 
methodology is faced with inevitable simplifications, as well as with the 
problem of the definition of success in foreign policy. Member states were 
identified as “leaders” when they either took the initiative in a constructive 
way or acted in an exemplary way, which involved a political judgment 
and should not be considered definitive. In addition, according to the 
authors of the Scorecard, the meaning of being a “leader” varies in 
each case. Namely, a small state may need to spend great energy on 
blocking a policy development or proposal that it disagrees with, which 
does not show up on the Scorecard, and may result in a false picture of 
overall activity and influence. Furthermore, the causal link between one 
specific set of European policies on the one hand and results on the other 
is problematic.6 Having this in mind, one needs to point at the limitations of 
the “fuzzy” quantity presented by the Scorecard as well as the conclusions 
reached in this research that are based upon it. However, the Scorecard 
offers the only quantitative analysis of EU foreign policy and the activism 
of each member state.
Twelve EU member states, with a population below six million, were 
analyzed as the primary target group. The next eight EU member states, 
with a population between six and 12 million (more specifically between 
7.3 in the case of Bulgaria and 11.3 million in the case of Greece), were 
studied as a secondary group, in order to compare the results between 
the two groups and to examine whether population size, as a key factor, 
directly influences the number and scope of small states’ foreign policy 
activities, or if other factors should be taken into account. Therefore, the 
number of the leadership positions divided among twenty EU states with a 
population below 12 million, based on the ECFR Scorecard for 2011, 2012, 
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called “leaders” according to the ECFR Scorecard) were compared to 
population, total GDP and GDP per capita metrics for the aforementioned 
states. The number, as well as the character and geographical scope 
of foreign policy initiatives in which those states were “leaders” were 
analyzed in order to identify possible regularities that would support the 
following three hypotheses:
H1: When it comes to small EU member states, the size of the state, 
measured by its population, affects its foreign policy activism.
H2: The level of economic development (measured by total GDP 
and GDP per capita) as well as the current economic difficulties 
(recession, high unemployment etc.) affect the intensity  of 
foreign policy activism of small EU member states. Higher GDP per 
capita and better economic performance mean a higher level 
of foreign policy activism (and vice versa).
H3: Small EU states have a narrow foreign policy scope, primarily 
focused on their surroundings. They are either not interested or 
not capable (sometimes both) in becoming leaders in resolving 
issues that do not affect them directly.
Foreign Policy Making in the EU
Since the Maastricht Treaty the EU’s external policies have been formulated 
and managed under one of two separate institutional processes: 1) the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which includes Common 
Security and Defence Policy and is intergovernmental in nature (acting 
on the basis of unanimous agreement in the European Council and the 
Council of the EU) and 2) external policies in areas such as trade, foreign 
aid and  EU enlargement, which are shaped and executed under a 
supranational or “community” decision-making process involving all 
three main EU institutions. However, the Lisbon Treaty set out to remedy 
the following three weaknesses identified regarding the EU foreign policy 
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process: the difficulty of achieving political agreement among 28 member 
states, insufficient institutional coordination and coherence (manifested in 
intergovernmental and supranational strands of external policy not being 
linked in a meaningful way), and the shifting priorities of previous institutional 
arrangements (rotating six-month national presidencies in external affairs). 
Therefore, a new position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy was created to allow the performance of external 
policy duties by combining the roles of the previous High Representative 
and External Affairs Commissioner, as well as that of the Presidency. This 
position coordinates the intergovernmental and “community” dimensions 
of EU external policy, thus presenting an institutional bridge that couples the 
interests of small and big member states. In order to support the work of the 
High Representative in coordinating and implementing EU foreign policy, a 
new EU diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was 
created (an operational center connected to a worldwide EU diplomatic 
service in external countries), as well as the function of a new permanent 
president of the European Council serving a once-renewable, two-and-a-
half-year term (Mix 2013:2 ). Small states prefer the “community method” of 
decision-making, as stipulated in the treaties, which involves the European 
Commission taking the initiative, while the Council of the European Union 
(representing the member states) and the European Parliament making 
the final decision. With the enlargement rounds of 2004, 2007 and 2013, 
which encompassed 13 new members (small states currently present a 
majority within the EU), the “community method” was preserved, even if 
it was weakened. On the other side, the rise of the European Council has 
undermined the “community method” and enhanced the power of big 
states (see Keating, McEwen, and Harvey 2014).
The EU has created institutional structures and instruments to develop and 
implement a CFSP and the member states have integrated their foreign 
policies to a remarkable degree on many issues. Therefore, “when the EU 
speaks as one, it can speak with a strong voice”. However, challenges 
remain on reaching consensus on CFSP, having in mind the different 
national positions, capacities, resources and coalition potentials of member 
states. At the same time, one needs to acknowledge the existence of a 
gravitational pull towards the institutional shield the EU provides for. Namely, 
although several big EU states remain international powers in their own right, 
analysts assert that, absent their membership in a strong and unified EU, 
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these states could someday find themselves being global middleweights. 
Similarly, although the smallest member states occasionally fear that their 
voices are being drowned out within the EU, they are arguably even less 
likely to be heard from outside the EU (Mix 2013: 8- 9).
The fact that the economic, political, military and diplomatic capacity of a 
member state plays an important role in determining its influence in EU bodies 
is a reflection of the current international system, which remains based on 
power relationships. The process of foreign policy making in the EU is currently 
based on an unwritten bargain between big and small states. Only big states 
have the capacity to assess the situation and to suggest a policy line on 
many foreign policy developments. The big states’ informal lead is tolerated 
by the other members since the system offers them a greater influence than 
they would have otherwise. Therefore, small states tolerate the fact that 
many important foreign policy discussions in the EU are preceded by informal 
consultation involving only the big states (Lehne 2012:3).
In the absence of clear rules, this relationship remains inherently unstable. 
There is constant concern among the small states that the informal 
steering role of the big states might turn hegemonic and that they will 
increasingly be confronted with pre-made decisions. The adoption of the 
Lisbon Treaty partly strengthened the leadership role of the big members, 
while its entry into force has affected the balance between big states’ 
leadership and the need for inclusiveness. In some ways, it strengthens the 
leadership role of the big members, as the European Council president 
and the High Representative find it more difficult to resist their positions. 
On the other hand, in terms of inclusiveness, the EEAS could gradually 
take over some of the steering functions that are currently informally 
assumed by the big member states (Lehne 2012: 4). As small states’ 
limited resources do not allow them to efficiently make lobbying efforts 
with every rotating Presidency, developing stable long-term relationships 
with the EEAS staff suits their needs better. Since the EEAS drafts the 
policy proposals, the small new member states can seek to influence the 
decision-making already in its formulation stage, through contacting the 
EEAS and providing their specific concerns. The evidence shows that small 
new member states, if their preferences and interests are well defined, 
can successfully inject their policy ideas through these new institutions, 
which is also demonstrated by our research (Pastore 2013: 78).
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Small states’ strategies and influence in the EU’s 
Foreign Policy Making
Most states in the international arena are not “powerful” and yet some 
of them still conduct relatively successful foreign policy. Lacking the 
resources (e.g. territory, natural resources, population, military or great 
history) they can set themselves only small or moderate goals. The 
possession of abundant material resources, i.e. power, in the traditional 
or the sense perceived by realism, does not automatically convert into 
successful foreign policy. Namely, success in foreign policy depends on 
both its efficiency and legitimacy, which are interdependent (Rolenc 
2013:1-2), and is not measured per se, but rather serves as a function of 
difficulty, possibilities or performance, given the underlying difficulty of 
issues and progress in meeting the set objectives. 
We claim that quantitative criteria (population, total GDP and GDP per 
capita) are significant and inevitable in understanding the behavior of 
states. Changes in international relations have given small states new 
avenues for influencing other states and taking on a foreign policy profile 
above their diminutive stature.  However, there is substantial variation 
among these states in the extent to which they have pursued an outsized 
foreign policy. Why have some small states demonstrated a higher level 
of foreign policy activism in the EU than others? Which criteria mostly 
influence small states’ initiatives and leadership in EU foreign policy making 
(Scheldrup 2014: 2)?
There are different foreign policy strategies used by small states in 
international relations. Vital (1967) identified the choice of three broad 
policies:  a passive strategy of renunciation, an active strategy designed 
to alter the external environment in their favor, or a defensive strategy 
attempting to preserve the status quo.7 Researchers have mainly claimed 
that the first and ultimate foreign policy goal of small states during the 
Cold War was to achieve defensive power, i.e. the ability to resist the 
offensive power of other units (Mouritzen 1998: 44), while in reality many 
of them have been able to exercise active foreign policy in some fields 
7 More information on small states’ foreign policy strategy in Luša, Mijić (2002). 
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of international cooperation(Goetschel 2000: 6). The end of the Cold 
War signalized a new impetus for small states to become more active 
and to start their leadership role within international organizations, which 
provided them with the necessary institutional and policy framework. 
Consequently, small states have participated in the international system 
in ways unaccounted for in previous literature. Braveboy-Wagner (2010: 
407) argues that small states will generally focus on smaller foreign policy 
circles, for example their regional neighborhood.8 “Even very small states 
can exercise power within limited domains as long as they possess certain 
capabilities and are ready to seize available opportunities” (Braveboy-
Wagner 2010: 407).
Since small states generally have fewer resources9 than big states, they 
are obliged to choose fewer fields of cooperation, in which they try to turn 
their existing resources and capabilities to their advantage (Šabič 2002: 6). 
A small state pursuing an active foreign policy strategy has to lean on the 
advantages as they arise from security geography (Benko1992: 6). Benko 
defines geography and history as determinants of the internal environment 
of a state’s foreign policy (1997: 233), while the external environment of 
foreign policy is mainly determined by features of a certain international 
system, including the role of international organizations. This environment 
also has geographical, economic, cultural and other determinants, but 
they are defined as “constituting an external environment of foreign 
policy” because they are “not easily susceptible to change and not part 
of the political process, which generates decisions” (Hill 2003:186). The 
internal (domestic) and external environments of foreign policy are not 
separated, but are in interaction (Bojinovic 2005:12).
Besides the definitional issue related to the concept of small states, the 
bulk of research is focused on what has become conventional wisdom 
in explaining small state behavior, namely the systemic and state level of 
analysis. Many findings point out that under specific conditions small states 
may yield substantial influence in EU foreign policy. For example, Lindell and 
Persson (1986: 80-85) identified three systemic factors, which are particularly 
relevant for the study of small states’ activism in EU foreign policy: the 
8 The main exceptions are those states that have high GDP (because of a very high GDP per capita), for example 
Sweden.
9 Understood as political capital as well as tangible resources such as money, troops and training personnel.
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structure of the system, the state of the system and the prevailing norms 
within a given system. The structure of the system is defined as the extent to 
which a system is hegemonic or hierarchical, or whether it is characterized 
by a balance of power or not. In the context of the EU, this differentiation 
could be seen in terms of institutionalization: whether the policy area 
under investigation is densely institutionalized or whether it remains highly 
hierarchical (Nasra 2010: 2). Namely, the degree of institutionalization is 
positively correlated with possibilities for small states’ activism, taking into 
account their lack of capacities and resources to participate in behind the 
scenes arrangements and deals, mostly agreed by big states. A second 
systemic factor is the state of the system, which refers to the degree of 
tension and conflict between the dominating actors. It is assumed that 
increased tension between dominating actors leads to more possibilities for 
small states to exert influence, acting for example as mediators. Prevailing 
norms are the last systemic factor and are generally associated with a 
constructivist reading, stressing the importance of informal rules, roles and 
identities. There are certain policy areas in which small member states 
proved their role as norm entrepreneurs (Finland and the EU’s Northern 
Dimension, Sweden and Conflict Prevention, the Scandinavian countries 
and European Security and Defence Policy) (see Nasra 2010: 2-3).
According to Nasra, the success of a small state’s behavior depends 
foremost on “the existence of a window of opportunity”, which is mostly 
created by the preferences of big member states, structure of the policy 
process, as well as the existence of generally accepted norms of behavior. 
Nevertheless, a small state still needs to “pursue active national strategies 
in order to valorize the existence of a window of opportunity” (Nasra 2010: 
14). This is the area in which there are huge differences between small EU 
member states. Namely, while some are proactive and innovative in their 
foreign policy behavior, others are reactive by using buck passing and 
bandwagoning strategies (by leaving leading roles to other states, as well 
as by exploiting other states’ initiatives). The notion of a state “should be 
seen in relation to the power it exercises rather than the power it possesses” 
(Mouritzen, Wivel 2005: 4). Whereas being small is a characteristic of 
states at a systemic level, the difference between small and big can be 
significantly reduced when it comes to a state’s actions and strategies 
(state level)10 (Nasra 2010: 14). The article focuses on determining the 
10 Recent studies have focused on domestic sources of power to explain small states’ foreign policy behavior and 
influence. Four factors have been put forward: commitment, network capital, immaterial resources and the ability to 
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correlation between the levels of foreign policy activities (in this case the 
number of foreign policy initiatives in which small states were leaders11) 
influenced by developments in the international community (systemic 
level) and quantitative criteria (material power they possess expressed 
through their GDP) as state characteristics.
Analysis of small member states’ activism in EU 
foreign policy 
Table 1. GDP (in millions of Euros), GDP per capita (in Euros) and  
population (in thousands) of the twenty analyzed EU member 
states:12
GDP in millions of 
Euros
GDP per capita in 
Euros
Population in thousands
Malta 7.200 17.100 400
Cyprus 16.500 19.000 900
Estonia 18.400 13.800 1.300
Latvia 23.400 11.600 2.000
Lithuania 34.600 11.700 3.000
Slovenia 35.300 17.100 2.100
Bulgaria 39.900 5.500 7.300
Croatia 43.100 10.100 4.300
Luxembourg 45.500 83.400 500
Slovakia 72.100 13.300 5.400
Hungary 97.900 9.900 9.900
Czech Republic 149.500 14.200 10.500
Ireland 164.100 35.600 4.600
Portugal 165.700 15.800 10.500
deliberate (Nasra 2010). Analysis of these variables could cast a different light on our findings (most notably, whether 
a state is pro-EU or EU-skeptical, and whether it specifically believes or disbelieves in the EU’s effectiveness and 
legitimacy as a diplomatic and security actor). However, this kind of analysis surpasses the scope of this article.
11  It is possible for member states to “lead” either directly (in other words by forcing or persuading member states to take 
action) or indirectly (“leading by example”).http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2014/extras/methodology.
12  Population of the EU and its member states (estimate on January 1, 2014):http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/
table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00001&plugin=1 (accessed 28 May 2014).
 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/
 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/ GDP_per_capita,_consumption_per_capita_and_
price_level_indices#Further_Eurostat_information (accessed 29 September 2014).
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Greece 182.100 17.400 11.300
GDP in millions of 
Euros
GDP per capita in 
Euros
Population in thousands
Finland 193.400 35.600 5.400
Denmark 249.100 44.400 5.600
Austria 313.000 37.000 8.500
Belgium 382.700 34.500 11.200
Sweden 420.800 43.800 9.600
Figure 1. GDP (in millions of Euros), GDP per capita (in Euros) and population 
(in thousands) of the twenty analysed EU member states
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Table 2. The twelve smallest (with population below six million) EU 
member states: “leaders” from the ECFR Scorecard, 2011-201313, 
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Overall progress of 
enlargement in the 
Western Balkans
1
Rule of law, 
democracy and 
human rights 




13 The ECFR Scorecard graded foreign policy activities of the EU member states in which these states were recognized 
as leaders in six areas: China, Russia, the United States, Wider Europe, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, 
and Multilateral Issues and Crisis Management. Each area had a various number of issues graded. In 2011, China, 
Russia and the United States had four, Wider Europe and MENA region had five, and Multilateral Issues and Crisis 
Management seven. In 2012, relations with China and the United States had four grades, while relations with Russia 
and those with Wider Europe had five. Relations with the MENA region and Multilateral Issues and Crisis Management 
had six grades. In 2013, all of the areas had five issues that could have been graded. Therefore, the maximum number 
for each area in the three year period was the following: China 13, Russia 14, the United States 13, Wider Europe 15, 
MENA region 16, and Multilateral Issues and Crisis Management 18.
 http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/ (accessed 2 June 2014).
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Table3. Eight EU member states with population between six and twelve 
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Table 4. States and areas of foreign policy activity according to the 
ECFR Scorecard, 2011 -2013:

















Estonia 2 3 5 11
Latvia 2 2 4
Slovenia 0
Lithuania 4 3 7
Croatia* 0
Ireland 1 8 9
Finland 1 1 1 8 11
Slovakia 4 2 6
Denmark 1 1 7 9
*Data available only from July 2013.
Bulgaria 1 3 4
Austria 3 5 8
Sweden 2 6 2 7 1 13 31
Hungary 2 3 1 6
Czech Republic 1 3 2 2 2 10
Portugal 1 1 1 3
Belgium 1 1 4 6
Greece 0
The analysis of the leadership initiatives (from the ECFR Scorecard, 2011-
2013) of the twelve smallest  EU members states by population shows that 
„smallness“, measured by population, need not be the limiting factor in 
their foreign policy activism. However, the results from the Scorecard have 
to be interpreted with considerable caution, and be related to specific 
knowledge about each of the studied states, especially regarding their 
geopolitical position, capacities of their economy, their institutions, 
traditional goals and features of their foreign policy. The foreign policy 
of states classified as “small” cannot be explained only by quantitative 
data and factors such as their population, total GDP and GDP per capita, 
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as it was elaborated in the previous sections. However, these factors, 
according to the results presented in this article, have an impact on the 
foreign policy activism of small states, judging by the number and scope 
of the analyzed activities.
Among the twelve smallest EU member states by population (Malta, 
Luxembourg, Cyprus, Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia, Ireland, 
Finland, Slovakia, Denmark), there are three (Ireland, Finland and 
Denmark) which are not amongthe twelve smallest economies of the EU, 
given the fact that they have a very high GDP per capita. At the same 
time, three states that are not among the twelve least populated states 
of the EU belong to the group of the EU’s twelve smallest economies 
(Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Czech Republic),with their GDP per capita 
being well below the EU28 average (Bulgaria has the lowest GDP per 
capita of all the EU members).14
The twelve least populated EU member states (if we take population as a 
factor that determines “smallness”) referred to as the “smallest” member 
states15 (that are shown in Table 2) demonstrate a very different numbers 
of foreign policy activities in which they were recognized as “leaders”. 
Those with most activities were Finland and Estonia (11 activities each), 
followed by Ireland and Denmark (9 activities each). Estonia, with a 
population of only 1.3 million presented a high level of foreign policy 
activism. Nevertheless, most of these activities were oriented towards the 
neighboring countries (Russia) and the Wider Europe region (The Eastern 
Partnership countries in particular: Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova). The 
case of Estonia shows that population size need not be a decisive factor 
influencing foreign policy activism, although the mentioned activities are 
mainly focused towards neighboring states and regions.
Finland, a neutral and economically highly developed state, showed a 
respectful level of leadership initiatives in the analyzed period. However, 
Finland’s foreign policy activities were mostly oriented towards multilateral 
issues, crisis management, and less towards the Wider Europe region. 
14 Romania is the 17th economy of the EU, although it is the EU’s seventh most populated state. It was not particularly 
analyzed in this paper, since in 2013 it had 20.1 million inhabitants. However, its foreign policy activism according to 
ECFR Scorecard showed a disproportionately low level of activities in comparison to its population.
15 There is also a noticeable difference in the size of the population of the 12 smallest EU members. The population of 
Denmark (5.6 million) is 14 times bigger than the population of Malta (0.4 million).
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Issues related to climate change were Finland’s priority within the EU, 
particularly relations with two of the World’s biggest polluters – China and 
the U.S., which could also be perceived as an indicator of Finland’s global 
priorities (global warming). Ireland, an economically highly developed 
state, presented nine leadership activities, which were all but one 
devoted to multilateral issues and crisis management, with a recognizable 
humanitarian character. Denmark, a small state by population, but a 
developed economy and a NATO member since its founding, focused 
its activities on multilateral issues and crisis management. In addition, as 
well as Finland, it showed leadership in climate change issues in relation 
with China and the U.S. Luxembourg, the most developed EU member 
state, focused all of its foreign policy leadership initiatives towards 
multilateral issues and crisis management, increasing its humanitarian and 
development aid, and helping Syrian refugees.
According to the Scorecard, Lithuania devoted all of its leadership 
activities (7) to one neighboring state (Russia) and its neighboring region, 
the Wider Europe. Lithuania is a good example of a small state that 
focused its foreign policy initiatives primarily towards its neighborhood 
(especially towards Russia). Latvia had four activities, two of which were 
aimed at the visa regime liberalization with Eastern Partnership countries 
and the other two at multilateral issues and crisis management. The issue 
of the visa liberalization regime is an issue in which most of the small EU 
members from Central and Eastern Europe showed leadership initiatives, 
since they are geographically and historically mostly connected with 
the states of the Eastern Partnership. The other important interest for the 
countries focused on the Wider Europe region was the effort to diversify 
energy supply in Europe in order to reduce dependency on Russia.  
Geographical proximity to Russia is closely linked with the Baltic States’ 
preferences in their shared eastern neighborhood region. Thus, the 
European neighborhood policy helped them to redefine relations with 
Russia, as well as to find their own place within the EU. Therefore, immediately 
after joining the EU, all three countries announced the Eastern partnership 
as one of their top priorities (see Pastore 2013: 69-70). In most cases, small 
new member states have learned the importance of a constructive interest-
mediation style. One such example is Lithuania which has learned a lesson 
on the need for compromise. After the 2008 elections, Lithuanian foreign 
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policy changed its rhetoric from troublemaker to a more pragmatic and 
cooperative approach, while the policy priorities remained the same. This 
pragmatic approach was maintained during Lithuania’s EU Presidency 
in 2013, e.g., with the government strictly following the Brussels official 
line. Another example is Estonia. Despite bilateral problems with Russia, it 
sought to escape the image of a “one-issue” state by purposefully taking 
a restrained approach and downplaying them as “technical” problems 
(see Vilpišauskas 2011).
Cyprus16 presented two leadership activities (assisting Syrian refugees 
and reciprocity on visa procedures with the U.S.)17, while Malta had 
one, related to its southern neighborhood (North Africa region), where 
it supported closer security cooperation in 2013. Namely, Malta’s foreign 
policy seeks to use its geopolitical relevance to maximize its influence. 
Therefore, it is focused foremost on stability in the Mediterranean region, 
from which non-military threats, such as irregular migration, emerge. Given 
its relevance for national security, migration has become Malta’s highly 
salient issue in the EU (Pastore 2013: 71-72).
Two of the twelve analyzed states were not recognized as “leaders” in 
foreign policy activities according to the Scorecard. The first is Croatia 
(which joined the EU only in July 2013) and the second one is Slovenia, 
which did not manage to achieve a single leadership initiative in three 
years. However, one has to bear in mind that the period being analyzed 
is one in which Slovenia and Croatia were faced with large economic 
difficulties. Slovenia’s key foreign policy interests were focused on its 
geographical vicinity, i.e. the Western Balkans (Pastore 2013: 71).
Of the states from the second group defined in our research (with 
a population between six and twelve million), the differences in the 
scope of foreign policy activities and especially the number were also 
visible. Greece, the most populous among the twenty states, did not 
manage to achieve a single leadership initiative in the 2011-2013 period, 
according to the Scorecard. The immense socio-economic difficulties 
that Greece has been facing represent the most probable explanation 
of this condition. Portugal had three initiatives and Bulgaria four. Both 
16 One needs to take into account that some states were more affected by the economic crisis in the analyzed period, 
which influenced their foreign policy activism.
17 Generally, theforeign policy preferences of Cyprus in the EU are explicitly linked to its geographic proximity to Turkey.
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states belong to the so-called “European periphery” and have been 
faced with serious socio-economic difficulties, as well as Hungary, whose 
leadership roles were primarily oriented towards its eastern neighborhood 
(Wider Europe). Belgium devoted most of its initiatives to multilateral issues 
and crisis management. As a state with a very “sensitive” political situation, 
and a high level of socio-economic development, it focused its activism 
on multilateral initiatives and crisis management. Austria, traditionally a 
neutral state, devoted its foreign policy activities to similar issues, but it also 
showed leadership related to the Western Balkans (especially to Kosovo), 
since it is mostly economically involved in the region. The Czech Republic 
showed 10 leadership roles during the analyzed period, which were almost 
evenly distributed within all areas of interest, except for the MENA region. 
Finally, Sweden showed a disproportionately (considering its population of 
9.6 million) high level of leadership activism. Sweden was recognized as 
a leader in 31 activities, being the only state that showed leadership in all 
studied areas. As a traditionally neutral state, it demonstrated a high level of 
foreign policy activism that is common for much bigger states, such as Italy, 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Namely, it was recognized as 
a leader in 13 issues related to multilateralism and crisis management, but 
was also very active in relations with Russia and Wider Europe.
Conclusion
In order to verify our second hypothesis, we compared the results from the 
ECFR Scorecard (Tables 2, 3 and 4) with the numbers in Table 1 and Figure 1. 
Among other data, the level of total GDP and GDP per capita for each state 
is presented. We also recognized the annual growth rate in the years 2009-
2013 as a probable indicator of foreign policy activism (see Figure 2).
Finally, in order to verify our third hypothesis, the results from the ECFR 
Scorecard (Tables 1, 2 and 3) were studied in detail.
Consequently, Table 5 presents the results of attempting to verify our 
hypotheses. We have compared the results from the ECFR Scorecard (Tables 
1, 2 and 3) to Figure 1, which presents the population of the analyzed states.
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Table 5. Verification of hypotheses for the studied states:




Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3
Malta 1 Verified Partially verified Verified 
Luxembourg 5 Not verified (+) Verified Not verified
Cyprus 2 Verified  Verified Verified 
Estonia 11 Not verified (+) Verified Partially verified
Latvia 4 Partially verified Partially verified Partially verified
Slovenia 0 Not verified (--) Verified No data to conclude
Lithuania 7 Not verified (+) Not verified (+) Verified
Croatia 0 Not verified (--) Verified No data to conclude
Ireland 9 Not verified (+) Verified Not verified
Finland 11 Not verified (+) Verified Partially verified
Slovakia 6 Partially verified Partially verified Verified 
Denmark 9 Not verified (+) Verified Not verified
Bulgaria 4 Not verified (-) Verified Partially verified
Austria 8 Partially verified Partially verified Partially verified
Sweden 31 Not verified (++) Verified Not verified
Hungary 6 Not verified (-) Verified Verified
Czech 
Republic
10 Partially verified Partially verified Partially verified
Portugal 3 Not verified (--) Verified Not verified
Belgium 6 Not verified (-) Not verified (-) Not verified
Greece 0 Not verified (--) Verified No data to 
conclude
It can be concluded that the first hypothesis was completely verified in just 
two cases (Malta, Cyprus). All other states showed some level of discrepancy 
between their population and the number of recognized leading EU foreign 
policy roles, whether they had a high number of recognized leading activities 
and relatively small population compared to other analyzed states, or vice 
versa. The hypothesis was partially verified for states that did not show a 
significant level of divergence between the population and the number 
of initiatives. The verification of the first hypothesisis closely related with the 
verification of the second one,18 recognized as crucial within the analyzed 
period (2011-2013). To verify the second hypothesis the annual GDP growth 
18 The level of economic development (measured by total GDP and GDP per capita) as well as the current economic 
difficulties (recession, high unemployment etc.) affect the intensity of foreign policy activism of “small” EU member 
states. A higher level of GDP per capita and a better economic performance in the analyzed period mean a higher 
level of foreign policy activism (and vice versa).
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rate in the years 2009-201319(besides the total GDP and GDP per capita) 
was analyzed (Figure 2). This period presents the time of the worst economic 
crisis most of the analyzed states were faced with in decades. Since the 
ECFR Scorecard did not exist prior to 2011, one cannot claim with the utmost 
certainty that small states’ foreign policy initiatives were more numerous 
prior to the economic crisis. However, since all the analyzed states are still 
recovering from the recession most of them were affected by in 2009, the 
number of their foreign policy activities appears to be closely linked to the 
economic difficulties that they have been coping with, and in some of the 
cases to the level of GDP per capita. A higher level of GDP per capita means 
more opportunities for multilateral actions, aid, assistance etc. Therefore, 
it could be suggested that there exists a correlation between the severity 
of the economic crisis, and the lack of foreign policy activism of the states 
analyzed during the five-year period (the longer the economic crisis, the less 
the state has foreign policy activities recognized by the ECFR Scorecard).
Figure 2. Total GDP of the analyzed states, annual growth rate in 
percentage, 2009-2013:
Hypothesis 3 was verified mainly for the new small EU member states, 
19 The data for the year 2013 were not available for all studied states from the same source so they were not included in 
this Figure.
See: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG.  
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which were mainly focused on the political and economic situation in 
their eastern neighborhood and their energy security, since most of them 
are still heavily dependent on gas imports from Russia. Currently, they 
are either not interested or not capable (sometimes both) in becoming 
leaders or in resolving issues that do not affect them directly. Small EU 
member states with a higher level of GDP per capita and less economic 
difficulties (mostly from Western and Northern Europe) are more focused 
on multilateral issues and crisis management. They are able to deal with 
these issues, notwithstanding their own economic difficulties, as they do 
not face such immense political and economic problems (that pose 
internal security challenges to them) in their immediate surroundings 
(unlike the “small” new members from Central, Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe). The results show that geographical proximity influences the scope 
and intensity of EU foreign policy initiatives in the case of small states on 
the EU’s Eastern and Southeastern “frontline”(more than other small EU 
member states).
Given the presented results, more of the hypotheses about the linkages 
between quantitative factors have been disapproved than proved 
(the findings especially undermine the first hypothesis). Therefore, there 
is a need for a more complex analysis taking different, more subjective 
perceptions that could cast a different light on the findings. The qualitative 
approach emphasizes the role a small state itself takes in relation to its wider 
environment.  Namely, small states might adopt a low-profile approach, 
keep out of the limelight and avoid attracting attention (Baillie 1998: 203). 
Several of the small states discussed are the ones that regard NATO or the 
US as the most decisive forces in their national security and wellbeing, and 
may be taking significant initiatives in that area, while others would pursue 
more normatively-motivated initiatives. Therefore, there is a need for a 
more complex analysis, taking the aforementioned qualitative criteria 
into account, especially due to the fact that some small states intervene 
or act as “leaders” only in the issues of primary importance for them. 
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